I’ve been on the road the
last week and haven’t had much time for blogging, but I have been clued in enough to
notice the friendly challenge in Ajay’s recent post and will do my best to
respond. Some preliminaries though: first,
let me say I am flattered by Ajay’s faith in my historical literacy on these
subjects, which may be misplaced. In the
absence of any further research, I’m not sure I really know much more than he
does about the legitimating ideologies of traditional elites, but I can at least try. Second, I thank him for the eloquent
restatement of my position in our debate, which I can assure you sounds better in his post than it did coming out of my mouth.
In seems the first question
to answer is: how much do Ajay and I actually disagree?
Most people in debates never ask themselves this question and if they did, it might save us all a lot of time (nothing would deflate our cable news
blowhards more quickly than realizing how insubstantial their disagreements actually
are in most cases). So then: do we disagree? Yes, but within clear limits. We are in total agreement over the content of
Millman’s argument and its plausibility as an analysis of the Richwine affair
and the emotions it has triggered in people. We also both think that genetic determinism
(especially in its racialized form) is a pernicious idea—dangerous in its
consequences and factually inaccurate.
We both think the same is true for “meritocracy” as a legitimating
ideology for liberal capitalist elites, and for the following reason:
by making the inequalities of our society into a matter of “choice” rather than
chance or circumstance, it undermines the sense of obligation and sympathy people
would normally feel toward the less fortunate (even referring to the poor as
“less fortunate” would of course have to fall by the wayside if we were really
good meritocrats).
I’m not sure about the extent
to which Ajay and I disagree about what sort of theory of social inequality should govern our public discourse. My sense is that we would both reject any
reductionist account, if only because any totally reductionist theory requires only a single exceptional anomaly to be refuted (to the
delight of generations of PhD students in the social sciences seeking to find that
elusive “original contribution”). With regard to inequality, it
seems probable to me that genes play some role in producing individual outcomes, but in such endlessly specific ways that it seems implausible their
role would map in any traceable way onto those mega-categories by which our "mind-forged manacles" are made, like class and race. So the theory of social
inequality I would like to see governing our public discourse would, I suppose,
run something like this: the causes of inequality are various, and no one can be totally excluded. However, they interact with one another in such profoundly complex ways
that we should be suspicious of any attempt to excuse existing
social inequality on the basis of one cause or another. Given how hard it is to disentangle the
“individual” causes from the “social,” in other words, we should begin by assuming that any existing
inequalities are unjust and remediable. Like I said,
I’m not sure if Ajay would disagree with any of this, but I suspect he would not, or not much.
So it seems then that the
only really significant disagreement between us does not concern
any theory of social inequality to which we are consciously committed, but
rather with how we compare and evaluate the various alternative theories of
which we disapprove. Ajay seems
more sympathetic than I am to some version of a traditional and paternalistic
theory of social inequality, even if he does not commit himself to it: a
theory, as I understand it, something like Burke’s idea of the “natural
aristocracy,” which would not be genetically or racially deterministic, but
which places a strong emphasis on differences of innate capacities (while also
acknowledging luck, social circumstance, differences in available opportunities
to develop one’s innate capacities, etc.) in accounting for (and legitimating) traditional
inequalities. I will call this “Burkean
determinism” to distinguish it from its modern racialized and pseudo-Mendelian
permutations.
I don’t disagree with Ajay
about whether or not this view (as opposed to a more thoroughgoing determinism)
was the prevalent view among traditional elites for most of history, but I
suspect I do disagree with him about how sympathetic we should find it and whether
or not it is preferable to meritocracy.
I will devote the rest of this post to trying to explain why I find it
uniquely pernicious, even bearing in mind the serious problems we both find in
meritocracy. This does not mean I
disagree with Ajay in the slightest when he says “while meritocracy may not be
more corrupting of elites on the whole than genetic determinism, a meritocratic
elite will be prone to a specific form of corruption which will not afflict an
elite that subscribes to genetic determinism.”
That’s probably true, although I think its implications are more limited
than Ajay seems to be implying. Most
liberal institutions and ideologies are prone to dangers which their (in my
view worse) illiberal alternatives avoid. The trains ran on time under Mussolini, etc. etc. but that doesn't mean we should prefer dictatorship to democracy. It seems that meritocracy,
while posing unique problems, is similarly preferable to those alternatives which are even less egalitarian in orientation.
Ok, so having boiled the
argument down to this point, it seems the real difference between us in one of
sensibility rather than expressed convictions.
I want to look at one passage in particular to show what I mean. Ajay writes: “It seems to me that even if
genetic determinism gives rise to all of the problems Josh mentions (as seems
plausible), it doesn't provide the same sort of support to [some of the most
corrupting implications of meritocratic ideology]; this is even apparent in his
claim that elites in genetically determinist societies tend to argue that the
poor enjoy their squalor, which while obviously awful is concerned with their
well-being in a way that meritocrats often are not. This point doesn't
necessarily imply that genetic determinism will lead to a better society than
meritocracy on balance (and in any case I think we should reject it because
it's unsupported by the best available evidence), but it does suggest that we
have something to learn from genetically determinist elites.”
Where I would disagree with Ajay most in this passage is when he seems to imply that the concern shown for the poor by the Burkean determinist in the claim that they enjoy their squalor is a point in that ideology's favor. I think this gets at a deeper difference of sensibility between liberals and Burkeans which is worth examining in detail. It seems clear to me, though I invite argument on the point, that
there is nothing better about contempt dressed up in the guise of morality or
religion or pity. In fact, I would argue that it is quite a bit worse
when packaged in this way, and that the victims of injustice don’t tend to experience gratitude for any “concern” shown by the man with the boot on their necks, but
view his moralistic pity as an added humiliation. This sort of thing is counterintuitive, but I
suspect we all have experiences of shame from our own past we can tap into in
which a “there, there” from our tormenter only made the defeat more
galling. It is infinitely better to be
shoved up against the wall by someone who wants to steal your lunch money than
by someone who is searching you for contraband and who robs you, when he finds
it, of even the thin consolation of holding the moral high ground. This is what I understand Judith Shklar to have been referring to when
she discussed “moral cruelty,” and I think she is right to find in liberalism a
unique distrust of this category of ignominious behavior.
Montaigne,
one of those great pre-liberal liberals, wrote the original critique of “moral
cruelty” in his famous essay on the cannibals, where he argued that if men are
to commit appalling acts of cruelty against one another, they should at least
be straightforward about it, as the Cannibals are, and not double the crime by
heaping moral obloquy on their victims.
What made Montaigne prefer the Cannibals to the Europeans was that,
though both made wars and killed, the Cannibals treated their victims precisely
as they themselves knew they would be treated if they were caught in their
turn, rather than trying to argue that their enemies somehow uniquely “deserved
it.”
By all of this I’m not trying
to make some pseudo-Marxist defense of meritocratic ideology. I am not suggesting that by
legitimating an even more direct indifference to the poor it
“unmasks” the “true face” of capitalism and thus paves the way for the
revolution, whereas a kinder, gentler paternalism on the part of elites only
ensures the system’s longevity, etc. The
Marxists are right that it is a form of sadism to keep a sick patient alive with palliatives when a cure is ready to hand, but they have yet to
demonstrate that they have found that cure or know how to use it. In the meantime, if an ideology leads elites
to act with greater kindness I would consider it preferable to it’s
alternatives.
On the other hand, if an
ideology does not lead to any appreciable improvement in the behavior or elites, or even worsens it, while also insisting to its victims that their
fate is “for their own good,” there is something uniquely grotesque about that
ideology. The spurious “concern” it
shows, at any rate, doesn’t do it much credit.
So what remains then is the
historical question: did Burkean determinism in its various forms actually
function to make elites more caring toward their subordinates? Was it a “haven in a heartless world”—or was
it a mere caricature of sympathy on the part of bullies and tyrants. Ajay appears to be
agnostic on this question, and so am I.
Some version of the Whig version of history we all carry around in our
subconscious, even if we’ve tried to purge ourselves of it, assures us it was the latter, but we should obviously be skeptical of anything in history which presents
itself to us with such certainty.
If we restrict our historical examples to one
country—Great Britain—it is certainly true that in our liberal meritocratic
societies today, non-elite individuals enjoy formal rights which they were not
guaranteed in the days of the eighteenth-century “Bloody Code,” when men were
hanged for filching pocket handkerchiefs, etc., or in the great age of
enclosures in the early modern period, when poor farmers were expelled en masse
from the commons of the medieval villages to make room for grazing —events which led Thomas More to remark that in England, the sheep had become eaters of men rather than the
other way around.
However, the traditionalist
could always insist that such examples only strengthen her claim, as they
reflect the disruptions visited upon a harmonious medieval society by modern
innovations and the growth of liberal individualism. After all, it was Locke’s theory of
individual property rights that justified the theft of the traditional rights
of the small farmers in England. Some
historians have argued that the human rights guarantees of our day, far from
reflecting some unbending trajectory toward moral progress, came into being
precisely because the disruptions of modernity were so painful and catastrophic
that they required some more formal guarantee to depend upon.
However, I am skeptical of
this traditionalist argument, mostly because it doesn’t seem falsifiable. Confronted with evidence of how little
traditional elites cared to respect the rights and dignity of the poor, the
traditionalist can always push back the horizon of modernity and insist
that the example you gave only proves that it occurred "after all the trouble
started." And I suspect that if you play
this game long enough, you will discover that the trouble started when the
first homo sapien beaned the first Neanderthal on the head with a stone mallet
or some time in that vicinity. The whole
thing reminds me of the libertarian who, confronted with evidence of the deep
inequalities and injustices prevailing in some roughly laissez-faire society
insists that that society simply wasn’t libertarian enough—the government must
have been in there somewhere mucking things up.
The more relevant point
here is that the examples we tend to think of as representative of the ideology
“Burkean determinism” all date from well after humanity left the traditionalist
Eden, however one chooses to date that mysterious fall. It was the same British school boys
at Eton who read Aristotle’s Nichomachean
Ethics as their “second Bible” and learned from it that some people in the
world are “natural slaves” who grew up to enact the Bloody Code and the Enclosure
laws. And then there’s the case of Burke
himself, who, for all his paternalistic rhetoric, was a Smithian classical liberal with respect to the traditional rights of
the poor and laboring classes. As E.P. Thompson puts it: “It is, perhaps, appropriate that it was the ideologist who
synthesized an hysteric anti-jacobinism with the new political economy who
signed the death-warrant of that paternalism of which, in his more specious
passages of rhetoric, he was the celebrant. ‘[To] The Labouring Poor’, exclaimed
Burke: ‘Let compassion be shewn in action, ... but let there be no lamentation
of their condition. It is no relief to their miserable circumstances; it is
only an insult to their miserable under- standings .... Patience, labour,
sobriety, frugality, and religion, should be recommended to them; all the rest
is downright fraud'.”
It would seem, and it causes
me no surprise, that Burke’s belief that he belonged to a “natural aristocracy”
did not lead him to show paternal concern for the less fortunate, but to regard
them rather as something akin to beasts—a different sort of being from aristocratic
man altogether.
Meritocracy, for all its grave moral deficiencies, does not encourage
this particular superstition. It does
not tell anyone that she is less than human.
This is a limited point in its favor, perhaps, but an important one.
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