In two earlier posts now, I have expended energy on trying to clarify exactly what is wrong with the "simulation argument"—not because I think it is particularly likely to persuade anyone, nor because it would have any consequences if it did, but because it is a kind of epitome of faulty reasoning. If we can manage to pinpoint exactly where it goes astray, therefore, we can use what we have learned to defeat any number of other sophistries. More specifically, it will enable us to think our way out of that species of theological argument that seeks to work upon our sense of wonder at the inherent "implausibility" of our particular universe.
Having made the earlier arguments, I don't intend to revisit them fully here. I have already made the case to the best of my ability that the core of the argument's fallacy is to be found in the "principle of indifference." I will, however, lay out these arguments in abbreviated form once again, so that we don't need to turn back to those earlier attempts.