Sunday, November 15, 2026

Too Much Neoliberalism, or Not Enough?

 Last week's midterm elections were—among many other things—obviously an expression of economic discontent and a rejection of the status quo. Many on the left have tried to channel this malaise about the cost of living and the scarcity of basic goods into a rejection of capitalism and neoliberalism. 

But there's also a theory making the rounds that what people are really saying they want—if they could but find the words for it—is not less capitalism and neoliberalism, but more of it. 

This is not quite as absurd as it may sound. Part of the thesis of the "Abundance" liberals who emerged two years ago, with the publication of the Klein/Thompson book on the subject, was that Americans are really expressing a yearning for a bygone era of rapid productivity growth. The high cost of basic necessities—housing, healthcare, etc.—is really a supply-side problem. And if liberals would address themselves to expanding supply through improving productivity—rather than constricting it through regulation—they would actually achieve more of what people actually want. 

Over on The Argument podcast the other day, Matt Yglesias and Jerusalem Demsas were sharing versions of the same thesis under a slightly different lens. 

Yglesias's central point in this episode was that the one thing voters have said most clearly over the last two election cycles is that they want less inflation. But most of the direct ways to combat inflation have negative consequences that will prove extremely unpopular in practice. For instance, the Federal Reserve can raise interest rates still further, or Congress could slash social spending. Either of these restrictive conditions would slow employment growth, put people out of work, and ultimately stall inflation by so shrinking aggregate demand that companies have to lower prices to compete. 

Voters will obviously not like that—nor should they. If people's central objection to high prices right now is that they create a sense of scarcity and make people feel that the good things in life are out of their reach—then lowering prices by deliberately creating more scarcity, such that people simply cannot afford to pay higher prices no matter how much they want to—is not going to seem any better. Indeed, it will seem worse. 

So, what is to be done? Is this just a policy Catch-22 from which there is no escape? 

Yglesias suggests that there is a better set of options—but it looks a lot more like "abundance" than it does like democratic socialism or rejecting neoliberalism. He says that we should do some smart deficit reduction and budget balancing that doesn't put all the burden of the cuts on poor people (I'm with him on that and have some ideas—how about we save money by raising taxes on the wealthy while cutting off funds for ICE violence and lawless military attacks on Iran, Venezuela, people on boats in the Caribbean, etc.?). 

But beyond fiscal discipline, Yglesias says, we should also try to eliminate specific regulations that constrain supply in housing, health care, and other basic goods: pursue an "abundance" agenda, in short.

The answer under this theory, as Demsas points out, is not less economic liberalism, but more of it. Indeed, she is clear-eyed about how such an agenda—if pushed far enough to actually address the cost of living crisis most Americans are experiencing—would result in a fundamental transformation of much of American life. 

Yglesias is trying to position his cost-cutting supply-side neoliberal approach as simply giving voters what they said they wanted in the election; Demsas wants him to acknowledge that what he is actually talking about would be a much more comprehensive change than what they probably had in their minds.

One key question, then, in this debate is simply: are voters actually saying they want a neoliberal, supply-side, pro-growth, "abundance" agenda? 

I think it's hard to read the midterm election results that way in any straightforward sense. To be sure, people are very clearly rejecting inflation and the high cost of living, and all of this discourse about affordability is indeed a protest against a sense of scarcity. 

But at the same time, voters were not expressing much uncomplicated enthusiasm for some sort of neoliberal "build, build, build" program. To the contrary, a second central theme of this election was that voters are pointedly rejecting any building or addition to the supply of one specific good: namely, AI data centers. 

This, to my mind, gets at a core difficulty in the heart of the "abundance" agenda. Many of the proponents of this movement say that what voters are really discontented about is a lack of productivity growth. When people say they are nostalgic for the American mid-century, then, it's not so much because they are rejecting the "neoliberalism" of the 1980s, the abundance people say—it's because they are nostalgic for a time when society was rapidly gaining in productivity, and technological innovation was creating a sense of optimism and mass prosperity. The goal, then, should be more and more rapid technological change, not less. 

Yet, here we are a few years into the "abundance" agenda, and the same voters who reject high prices have also just as clearly sent a verdict against the one biggest technological change of our time: the introduction of AI. 

And even the proponents of "abundance" are not sure they are wrong about this. Ezra Klein has started calling for a total halt on recursive AI development, and he has expressed sympathy for voters' alarm about data center construction. He points out routinely on his show that even AI industry leaders are saying that their technology may destroy the world and/or take everyone's jobs, and he understands why voters would be rejecting this vision of the future. 

Meanwhile, Matt Yglesias on this episode of The Argument may have sounded at times like he just wants to see unregulated economic liberalism sweep through society until all that is solid melts into air—but on previous episodes he has acknowledged that he actually shares everyone else's alarm about the specific threat of AI job loss. He has said he thinks rapid productivity growth in AI really could end up putting a large share of Americans out of work, forcing people to depend on public benefits to survive. 

For their part, AI industry leaders can often do little better to defend this than to appeal to a sense of economic fatalism and determinism. The AI singularity is coming, they say—according to the tenets of their techno-religion. If we don't build it someone else will. So you have to let us build it as fast as possible, even if it does mean rapid job loss or something even worse—some catastrophic security breach or extinction-level scenario triggered by rogue AI. As Sam Altman put it in one notorious quote, according to Politico: "we believe that the world should accept some bad things happening for the benefits of this technology[.]"

Voters said: that's ridiculous. We don't have to submit to your insane dystopian vision of the future, and we won't. If you're saying that your new technology is going to take our jobs and possibly kill us all, then we won't let you built it, simple as that. And good for them! 

The voters are obviously right about this. I think Dwight Macdonald's point, in his classic vindication of humanism against any kind of technological or historical determinism, The Root is Man, is pretty much final here: "What becomes of the chief argument of Progressives — that out of present evil will come future good — if we now confront the possibility that there may not be a future?" 

This is the question everyone should be asking Sam Altman, when he argues we need to accept "bad things" for the sake of a technology that—he and his peers have also long said—might wipe out humanity. 

And since even the "abundance" proponents—people like Klein and Yglesias—also seem to agree with voters at this point that AI development is not necessarily something we should plunge into as rapidly as possible, this leaves them with a weird carve-out in their ideology. They say: generally speaking, our economic and political woes could be solved by having more rapid productivity growth. But then, when it comes to the one biggest technological innovation of our time—which proponents say will indeed increase productivity, whatever else the cost may be—they say: but this one innovation is likely to cause too much friction in the labor market and displace too many people, so maybe we should slow it down. 

But the things that people dislike about AI development are just an extreme and exaggerated form of the problems that accompany every kind of technological change or increase in productivity. People lose their jobs, and even if new ones are eventually created, they come too late or require such a different set of skills that they do nothing to save the individual people who lost work during the transition. As Thomas Carlyle wrote of the first industrial revolution: "The huge demon of Mechanism smokes and thunders, changing his shape like a very Proteus; and infallibly at every change of shape, oversetting whole multitudes of workmen [...] hurling them asunder, this way and that[.]"

The increase in productivity likewise causes a general uptick in the overall speed and noise of society. People can do each one thing more efficiently, it's true—but then for that very reason they are expected to do more things. The cognitive load of simply existing in modern society becomes much greater and more burdensome. 

Michel Houellebecq's controversial first novel Whatever is many things—but one of the things it is, is the first internet novel. France, as people may know, adopted an early version of the internet—the Minitel system—long before it came to the rest of the world. And one of the themes of Houellebecq's novel is the understandable resistance and annoyance people feel at the intrusion of this new technology into their world. True, the internet was increasing the flow of information, Houellebecq's narrator observes—but what if that is the one thing we don't need? What if it's just "a useless encumbering of the neurons" (Hammond trans.)?

In sketching the AI future from the "optimistic" perspective, for instance, one recent guest on Ezra Klein's show suggested that AI agents will create new cyber security risks and new forms of spam, and this in turn will breed new industries based around screening out spam calls and phishing attempts from AI agents, and that all of these new costs will add up to new jobs and higher GDP. 

As even this guest suggested in saying it, this "optimistic" version of what will happen with AI development sounds pretty dystopian. It sounds like an enormous "encumbering of the neurons" with useless information, if nothing else. 

Voters are right to ask the question: why are we doing this to ourselves, again? Do we really want this? As Dwight Macdonald observes in The Root is Man: maybe it's true that if we slow the rate of technological progress, we will have to make things more slowly. But why not make them more slowly? Why do we treat speed and efficiency as intrinsic goods? 

In his anti-colonial novel Mister Johnson, Joyce Cary satirizes the paradoxes of British imperialism in Africa during the Great Depression. One of his central characters—a cynical local administrator in British Nigeria—spends most of the novel desperately trying to build a road through the jungle. Once he completes the project, however, he struggles to remind himself of what it was for. The economic changes it introduces massively disrupt traditional African society. And of course, they do so in the name of bringing some vague notion of "modern civilization." But meanwhile (the novel was published in 1939), "modern civilization" seemed to be collapsing in on itself through industrial depression and war. 

As two British administrators in the novel put it in a dialogue: "Looks as if the whole show is going phut." "Yes, civilization's in a bad way." "Getting on a bit too fast" "Or not fast enough." "Yes, there's that too." 

All of the proponents of the new neoliberalism (if that is not too redundant for you) and the politics of "abundance" remind me of these two colonists. They can all agree that something has gone very wrong in our modern economy. On the one hand, it may be that things are going too slow—we haven't had meaningful productivity growth since the 1960s, and technological innovation is being constrained by regulations and supply bottlenecks. 

On the other hand, they admit—maybe things are going too fast. AI could take people's jobs before we have any social safety net set up or the industry can create and retrain people for new jobs that it might create. So maybe what really needs to happen is that we need less technological innovation and slower productivity growth. Maybe, as Robert Frost once put it, "Bounds should be set / To ingenuity for being so cruel / In bringing change unheralded[.]"

In the end, all we can agree on is that "things are in a bad way" and that "the whole show is going phut." 

Rudbeck, one of the administrators in Joyce Cary's novel, can't help but ask why his government is destroying the preexisting social order of Africa, "breaking up the old native tribal organization," without having any clearly workable model with which to replace it—given that England's own civilization was at that point in the throes of depression and war. "I suppose one mustn't talk about a plan," Rudbeck says. "Oh, no, no, no," replies his interlocutor—the senior colonial official—"They'll take you for a Bolshy." 

The context was different, but I couldn't help but think back to this passage in listening to The Argument podcast, when at one point Jerusalem accuses Matt of being sick of "plans"— "Isn't that a Matt Yglesias take," she says, "we shouldn't have any more plans?"

Here again, the clueless colonial administrators in Cary's novel sound a great deal like our "abundance" liberals. They say: let's charge ahead with productivity growth and "build, build, build!" But then, they also admit that, if we do build AI, we have no plan for how people who lose work as a result are supposed to survive. As Rudbeck asks in Cary's novel, after observing that the current modernization policies are destroying traditional civilization in Africa—"Are we going to give them any new civilization, or just let them slide downhill?" To which the senior official replies "cheerfully"— "No idea." 

Voters last week rightly said that they are not especially inclined to simply plunge into some brave new world without a plan for how it is supposed to be survivable or work to their benefit. They said: if you are proposing merely to take our jobs, and bombard us with useless noise and aggravation, and possibly destroy the world and our existing civilization, well—this is a democracy, and we are the ones who have the power the agency, and so—we are going to stop you. 

And they are quite right! Thank God for the voters, who had the courage to say no to the AI revolution at a time when the political and pundit class was inclined to simply submit to it in a spirit of resignation and neoliberal fatalism ("There Is No Alternative," as they used to say). The voters said clearly that slower is not necessarily worse; that small can be beautiful; that less can be more. They reminded us, as Oliver Goldsmith once put it, "that states of native strength possest, / Tho' very poor, may still be very blest[.]" (This election was—in this sense, at least—a rejection of neoliberalism, not an endorsement of it.) 

To quote Dwight Macdonald once again: 

It effective wars cannot be fought by groups the size of New England town meetings, and I take it they cannot, this is one more reason for giving up war (rather than the town meeting). If automobiles cannot be made efficiently by small factories, then let us make them inefficiently. If scientific research would be hampered in a small-unit society, then let us by all means hamper it. Said the young Marx: “For Hegel, the starting-point is the State. In a democracy, the starting-point is man... Man is not made for the law, but the law is made for man.”

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